

Before DarkSeoul Becomes DestorySeoul

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INTRODUCTION

Guarding national security in cyberspace has become a core interest for many nations connected to the Internet. Indeed, the growing dependence on fast evolving information technology and continuous occurrence of cyberattacks against nations demonstrate the need for solid security strategy in cyberspace. South Korea is not an exception in this regard. Notwithstanding cybercrimes on various scales, South Korea has undergone major cyberattacks in recent years. DDoS attacks on July 7 2009 and March 4 2011 temporarily took down public websites including those of the Presidential Office and the National Assembly. They were only to be followed by another attack against Nonghyup Bank, a major bank of South Korea, on April 20 2011 which shocked the nation by paralyzing financial transactions over the networks. Between these well-known attacks, smaller scale incidents occurred continuously in South Korea such as GPS jamming and spear-phishing attempts targeting particular social groups.¹

Indeed, cyberattacks against South Korea are intensifying. In 2013 alone, the nation has already known two significant cyberattacks on March 20 and June 25. In particular, the March 20 attack simultaneously targeted major banks and broadcasters in the country causing a panic to the nation. The malware used in the attack was later nicknamed “Dark Seoul” because of the repetitive use of the term in the malware programming source.² Dark Seoul's simultaneous attack implies that the action was the work of the same culprit, prepared over a long period of time.

Throughout the series of cyberattacks in the past, the South Korean government has remained consistent on pointing the finger at North Korea. Technically, the two Koreas have

¹ These include a class of graduate students from the National Military School and the Graduate School of Information Security, Korea University.

² Beom-jin Lee. “Warning for a mutant DarkSeoul virus” *The Weekly Chosun*. 1 Apr 2013. <<http://weekly.chosun.com/client/news/viw.asp?nNewsNumb=002250100007&ctcd=C04>>

been at a war since the ceasefire that stopped the Korean War in 1953. Since then, inter-Korean relations have gone through notable changes from the Cold War era confrontation, reconciliatory moves brought by the Sunshine Policy to the limited scale military collisions in the North's surprise attacks against the South's naval warship and civilian inhabited island in 2010. If the attacks indeed came from the North, the recent incidents in cyberspace will illustrate the changing nature of the conflict in the Korean Peninsula, reflecting a new concept of national security in which cyberforce plays a critical role.

Accurate assessment of the techniques and strategic calculations of the North shown in the past attacks will help South Korea prepare proper countermeasures. Among the series of cyberattacks from the North, the March 20 attack will be the focus of this paper not only because it is one of the most recent events, but also because the attack reveals much about the pattern of North Korea's aggressive activities in cyberspace. Overall, the paper serves two purposes: Firstly, to provide concrete and factual explanation as to the nature, intent and technical aspects of the March 20 attack. Secondly, to gauge possible attacks in the future and propose recommendations to South Korean policymakers. As Lewis³ argued, conflicts in cyberspace are yet to set new rules for strategic calculations different from the classical understanding of state behaviors in international relations.

NORTH KOREA'S EVOLVING CYBER CAPABILITIES SHOWN IN THE MARCH 20 ATTACK

Shortly after 2:00 p.m. on March 20 2013, computer networks of Nonghyup Bank and Nonghyup Life Insurance suddenly crashed along with those of major broadcasters in the country, KBS, MBC and YTN. About an hour later, Shinhan Bank and Jeju Bank reported similar problems on their networks. The media companies' websites were taken offline while

³ James A. Lewis "Conflict and Negotiation in Cyberspace" *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. Feb 2013. < http://csis.org/files/publication/130208_Lewis_ConflictCyberspace_Web.pdf >

bank clients were prevented from accessing online and mobile banking applications as well as the ATM services. In total, the attack resulted in the damage of 48,700 computers, servers and ATMs affiliated to the targeted organizations.⁴ South Korean institutions were not the only victims in the attack. On the same day, the Washington-based Committee for Human Rights in North Korea also reported its website under cyberattack and documents stolen. Interestingly, the attacks occurred a day before the voting took place at the United Nations Human Rights Council on the resolution for the establishment of an independent investigation of North Korean human rights abuses.⁵

TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ATTACK

The nickname “Dark Seoul” refers to the type of malware used in the March 20 attack. “KillMBR-FBIA and Dropper-FDH” and “Mal/EncPk-ACE” are the technical names given to this malware by McAfee and Sophos respectively. Initially discovered in 2012, the malware commonly disguises itself as an antivirus program and penetrates into the operating system of affected computers.⁶ The malware used in the March 20 attack had the same data structure as Dark Seoul, but the exact commands executed were slightly different.⁷ Destruction of hard disk drives and remote control were the two main functions of the malware, but the build path for both functions was identically “Make Troy” known to have

⁴ Eun-jae Lee. “3.20 cyberattack and its malwares (PPT)” *Korea Internet and Security Agency (KISA)*. Jun 27 2013. <<http://www.oas.org/cyber/events/KISA.pdf> >

⁵ Sang-hun Choe. “Computer Networks in South Korea Are Paralyzed in Cyberattacks” *The New York Times*. Mar 20 2013. <<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/world/asia/south-korea-computer-network-crashes.html?pagewanted=all&r=0> >

⁶ *The Weekly Chosun*. 1 Apr 2013.

⁷ Guilherme Venere. “South Korean Banks, Media Companies Targeted by Destructive Malware” *McAfee*. Mar 20 2013. <<http://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/south-korean-banks-media-companies-targeted-by-destructive-malware> >

been developed since June 2012.⁸ Some remarkable technical characteristics displayed in the attack are as in the following.

Shift from DDoS to APT

In the past, a number of South Korean institutions were the victims of distributed denial of service attacks or commonly known as DDoS, which flood targeted websites with overloaded traffic that eventually turn them inaccessible. Two major DDoS attacks occurred on July 7 2009 and March 4 2011 against South Korean government institutions. This type of attacks causes annoyance and inconvenience at best but does not leave any lasting damage to the victim once the massive traffics are cleared.

On the contrary, attacks classified as the advanced persistent threat or simply APT, often damage the targeted system to the level beyond a mere denial of access. APT is elaborated over a long period of time executing various activities such as information collecting, malware installation and disruption of operations on the targeted system.⁹ It requires more efforts and patience from the hacker than a DDoS attack because the process usually involves a chain of elaborate operations as wide as social engineering to initially break into the network, remaining undetected over a long period of time while mapping the network's defense system for another attack, and accessing vulnerable parts of the system to steal data and disrupt the operations.

As the malware continuously sends back the data it has gathered from inside, the hacker retains an unauthorized access to secret information from the target as long as the malware remains undetected inside.¹⁰ Nevertheless, the March 20 attack in 2013 did not mark the first known APT attack against South Korea. In April 2011, an APT attack had already wiped out

⁸ KISA. Jun 27 2013.

⁹ Symantec "Advanced Persistent Threats: How They Work" ©1995 - 2013 Symantec Corporation <
<http://www.symantec.com/theme.jsp?themeid=apt-infographic-1> >

¹⁰ Ibid.

files on Nonghyup Bank's computer networks even before the March 20 attack in 2013. The increasing shift from DDoS to APT suggests a grim reality for future cyberattacks that will be harder to detect, for which the consequences will be more destructive and the recovery markedly more laborious.

Destruction of Master Boot Records (MBR)

Another significant technical aspect of the March 20 attack can be found in the massive destruction of master boot records or MBRs. A MBR plays a critical role in booting a computer to start an operating system. It is the information in the first sector of any hard disk that identifies how and where an operating system is located so it can be loaded into the computer's main storage.¹¹ Therefore, its destruction means disabling the entire computer system. In the past DDoS attacks against South Korea, hackers destroyed MBRs of the zombie computers at the final stage of the attack in order to delete the traces of routing.

When Nonghyup Bank came under cyberattack in April 2011, however, hackers deliberately ordered MBR destruction as the means to cause direct damage to the targets. In the March 20 attack in 2013, hackers further maximized the impacts of MBR destruction by differentiating the destruction methods according to the specific operating systems used in each targeted institution's computers.¹²

MBR destruction both in the 2011 and 2013 incidents suggest a strong linkage between the two, because such attack would not have occurred had the hackers merely sought for a financial gain or spread of political message.¹³ In relation to this point, McAfee also notes that the only goal of the hackers was making the targeted computers unusable because the

¹¹ Margaret Rouse. "Definition: Master Boot Record (MBR)". *Search Cio-Midmarket*. April 2005. <<http://searchcio-midmarket.techtarget.com/definition/Master-Boot-Record> >

¹² Seon-mi Jeong. "Damage caused by 3.20 cyberterror, 40 times more serious than 2011 attack" *Chosun Biz*. Mar 1 2013. <http://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/03/21/2013032102342.html >

¹³ Yong-seok Kim, Ho-jae Jeong, Yeong-il Son. "Destruction of hard disks suggests link to 2011 attack" *Dong-A Ilbo*. Mar 22 2013. <<http://news.donga.com/3/all/20130322/53885761/1> >

malware did not make any other changes in the system such as dropping files or changing registry keys.¹⁴

Malware targeting MBR is not only difficult to detect, but also the restoration is almost impossible.¹⁵ Computers may go unnoticed of MBR infection until hackers order visible actions analogous to self-destruction as in the cyberattacks against South Korea. Programming this type of malwares requires advanced knowledge about the complicated MBR structure and patient endeavor over a long period of time for a successful execution. This aspect leads to believe that the March 20 attack was the work of an organized hacker group, desiring to cause specific damage to South Korea, than that of individuals.¹⁶

Malware penetration through patch program

According to an analysis published by Symantec in the wake of the March 20 attack, the suspected malware was identified as Trojan Horse/Trojan.Jokra.¹⁷ Once inside the targeted system, Trojan.Jokra took following actions in sequence: create a file referencing itself with “JO840112-CRAS8468-11150923-PCI8273V”¹⁸; map the object; end the antivirus processes provided by two local security companies, AhnLab Policy Agent’s “pasvc.exe” and Hauri ViRobot ISMS’ “clisvc.exe”; enumerate all drives; and finally overwrite the MBRs with one of these strings: “PRINCPES”, “PR!NCPES” or “HASTATI.” At the end of the process, all

¹⁴ McAfee. Mar 20 2013.

¹⁵ Hyunmok Lee. “[Threat Analysis] Fearful bootkit affects MBR” *AhnLab*. Jun 3 2011. <<http://m.ahnlab.com/kr/site/securityinfo/secunews/secuNewsView.do?seq=17907> >

¹⁶ Tae-hyeong Kim. “Cyberterror, similar to previous North Korean attacks” *BoanNews*. Mar 20 2013. <<http://www.boannews.com/media/view.asp?idx=35307> >

¹⁷ Symantec. “South Korean Banks and Broadcasting Organizations Suffer Major Damage from Cyberattack” *Symantec Official Blog Security Response*. Created on Mar 20 2013 and undated on Jun 26 2013. <<http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/south-korean-banks-and-broadcasting-organizations-suffer-major-damage-cyberattack> >

¹⁸ The hacker differentiated malware identifiers for the execution of the commands “destroying hard disk drives” and “remote control.” JO840112-CRAS8468-11150923-PCI8273V mentioned here was the destroying hard disk drives malware identifier whereas the remote control malware identifier was later found to be “JO840112-TONG8468-KSI82076-PCI8273T.”

contents in the affected hard disks were wiped out. Finally, the malware forced the computers to restart by executing "shutdown -r -t 0", the action that rendered the computers unusable as the MBRs and the contents in the drives had already been corrupted.

Before executing the actions, the malware must have found an entry point that let it into the matrix of massive inner corporate networks. It was later found that compromised Patch Management System (PMS) servers served as the malware installation vector. The constant automating patching operation of PMS on public or corporate networks is intended to ease the burden on security administrators in maximizing security.¹⁹ Once penetrated into the system through PMS, the malware quickly spread to the entire networks when PMS sent out next patching updates.

The sophisticated nature of the malware and the massive disk wiping on a simultaneous basis both hint the existence of a same entity behind the scene. An accurate identification of the hackers will help determine their ultimate objectives and conjecture likely attacks in the future.

NORTH KOREA GOING CYBER OVER DECADES

North Korea turned its attention to cyberwarfare in the mid-1980s when economic difficulties began in earnest, much in contrast with the increasing prosperity that its Southern neighbor was going through. The dire situation prevented the North from revamping its conventional arms and further forced it to reduce military intelligence resources and networks against the South. Undergoing such difficult period, cost-effective cyberwarfare provided an attractive option to North Korea in its effort to retrieve the growing military and economic

¹⁹ Jude Chao. "Patch Management System Best Practices" *Enterprise Networking Planet*. Jun 6 2013. <<http://www.enterprisenetworkingplanet.com/netsecur/patch-management-system-best-practices.html>>

gaps with South Korea.²⁰ The pace accelerated as the North witnessed strategic use of advanced information systems by the US forces during the Gulf War.²¹ After the course of the gradual development, North Korea's cyberforce experienced significant progress when the regime created the Reconnaissance General Bureau in 2009. Under the Bureau's supervision, Unit 121 specializes in penetrating into foreign servers to steal data and install malware.²²

Several other specialized departments also work systematically to enhance the nation's offensive cyber capabilities. These include the Central Party's Investigations Department and Enemy Secret Department Cyber Psychological Warfare Unit, each responsible for stealing secret information from foreign governments' networks and spreading rumors favorable to the North Korean regime respectively.²³

In fact, against what many outsiders would imagine, North Korea is not completely disconnected from the Internet. North Korea owns a network connected to the World Wide Web, but that is mainly used to spread pro-regime propaganda through its more than 440 newspapers, websites, social media accounts and other outlets.²⁴ In the era when the North still lacked its own Internet provider, only few members from highly privileged class were allowed to access the Internet via Chinese networks.

²⁰ Cheol Baek, "The Truths about North Korea's Cyberwarfare Capabilities", *Kyeonghyang Shinmun*, Apr 13 2013 <<http://news.zum.com/articles/6409296?cm=popular>>

²¹ Tae-il Jeong. "Surprising capabilities of North Korean cyber warriors" *Herald Kyeongjae*. Apr 10 2013. <<http://m.heraldbiz.com/view.php?ud=20130410000705&ntn=0>>

²² Ibid.

²³ Seok-ho Ahn. "Cyberspace, the 5th battlefield" *Segye Ilbo*. Sep 5 2011. <<http://www.segye.com/content/html/2011/07/06/20110706003962.html>>

²⁴ Hyon-hee Shin, "Seoul Faces Growing Cyber Warfare Challenges" *Korea Herald*, Mar 21 2013, <<http://m.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130321000980&ntn=0>>

North Korea has gradually expanded its presence on the web. In 2009, it established a joint venture with Thailand's Loxley Pacific Company²⁵ to introduce a network service in North Korea through an Internet provider named "Star Joint Venture". The company reportedly administers the North's "kp" domain.²⁶ As of December 14 2009, the company has registered 1,024 IP addresses from 175.45.176.0 to 175.45.179.255 to the Asia Pacific Network Information Center (APNIC).²⁷ A number of official North Korean websites including the Korean Central News Agency, Rodong Shinmun and the national portal Nae-nara, use IP addresses registered at this company.

At the same time, some still use IP addresses based in Shenyang, China, among which counts the official propaganda website "Uri-minzok-kkiri".²⁸ Furthermore, intranets such as Gwang-myeong-mang are available to North Korea's privileged elite, providing extremely limited and state-approved information only.²⁹ Some estimate the number of the official North Korean cyber army, counting only those considered as "strategically trained elite unit" under the direct control of leader Kim Jong-un, to be at least 3,000.³⁰ When operating abroad, notably in China, North Korean state hackers usually disguise themselves as software developers and animation producers.³¹

Broadly speaking, three main components form North Korean cyberforce: manpower, equipment and system. The manpower consists of state hackers who have mastered network

²⁵ Mathew J. Schwartz. "How South Korea Traced Hacker To Pyongyang", *Information Week*, Apr 11 2013. <<http://www.informationweek.com/security/attacks/how-south-korea-traced-hacker-to-pyongya/240152702>>

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ "Attackers' IP Based in Ryugyong-Dong" *E-Today*, Apr 11 2013
<http://money.joinmsn.com/news/article/article.asp?total_id=11197682&ctg=1100>

²⁸ "3.20 Cyberterror IP address traced back to Pyongyang's Ryugyong-Dong" *Donga Ilbo*, Apr 11 2013. <<http://news.donga.com/List/PoliticsNK/3/000301/20130411/54354257/1>>

²⁹ *Korea Herald*, Mar. 21 2013.

³⁰ Jeong-gyu Lee. "Realities of North Korean Cyber Troops" *Economy Segye*. Aug 30 2011.
<<http://economysegye.segye.com/articles/View.html?aid=20110826001828&cid=711308000000>>

³¹ Rak-in Jeong, "North Korean Hackers' Dangerous Deals", *Sisa Press*, Aug 24 2011.
<<http://m.sisapress.com/articleView.html?idxno=55919>>

related theories and are able to deliver sophisticated cyber battles. As to the equipment, North Korea imports high tech computers, mainframes and other network facilities from countries including China in order to provide an ideal training and operational environment to state hackers. Lastly, the system refers to an organized set of command, control and monitoring mechanisms designed for North Korean state hackers' systematic execution of an order. Once an order is delivered under the system, various hacker units move in a shipshape manner over a period of time to develop attacking malware, exploit the target's security vulnerabilities, hack the administrator's account, set an attack plan based on the reconnaissance and finally launch an attack from a third country such as China.³²

Because state hackers are easily exposed to the affluence of outside world through their activities on the web, the North Korean regime allegedly offers a competent rewards package so the hackers remain loyal to the regime.³³ Although the accurate cyber capabilities of North Korea are yet to be known, an official from South Korean intelligence service commented North Korean hackers have shown superior skills in hacking and programming whereas they seem slow with absorbing fast developing new information technologies.³⁴

NORTH KOREAN LINKAGE IN THE MARCH 20 ATTACK

Hackers usually showcase their skills by intentionally leaving clues to their identity. On the contrary, the culprits of the March 20 attack were extremely careful not to leave anything behind that might help uncover their identity. Investigation later revealed that the March 20 attack had been prepared at least over eight months. Individual hackers are unlikely to organize themselves and endure the time-consuming and labor-intensive tasks only to leave

³² Heung-kwang Kim. "North Korean Cyberterror and our response" *NK Vision*. Oct 10 2011. <http://www.nkvision.com/read.php?quarterId=NKV7&ca_item=4&num=165>

³³ Ho-yeol Choi, "North Korea's Full Scale War in Cyberspace Could Devastate South Korea", *Donga Ilbo*, Apr 21 2013, <<http://m.donga.com/Politics/BestClick/3/all/20130421/54559246/1>>

³⁴ *Sisa Press*, Aug 24 2011.

their attack anonymous. Despite the lack of clues, measuring the relevance of the March 20 attack with the intent and technical similarities discovered in the past attacks can provide a useful piece of evidence. After a series of investigation taking both aspects into account, North Korea again appears to be the one behind the March 20 attack.

Symantec analysis: Connection Between the 2011 and 2013 Attacks

If the culprits behind the series of cyberattacks against South Korea turn out to be same, it will then imply the existence of a politically motivated group, likely another nation state, which has a strategic interest in damaging South Korean infrastructures and intimidating the public. Following the March 20 attack, Symantec published on its blog³⁵ a technical analysis indicating possible connections between 2011 and 2013 attacks. Malware named “Trojan.Koredos” was used in the March 4 attack in 2011, and it was “Trojan.Jokra” in the March 20 attack in 2013.

In the Trojan.Koredos investigation, Symantec identified a sophisticated back door “Backdoor.Prioxer” that infected files in a discreet manner. A modified version of this backdoor (named “Backdoor.Prioxer.B” by Symantec) resurfaced during the Trojan.Jokra attack in 2013. They shared the same command and control base protocol. The difference was that the newer version did not proxy Internet Relay Chat (IRC) communications as in the older one.

In the 2013 Trojan.Jokra attack, hackers also used the Jokra packer³⁶ to obfuscate both Trojan.Jokra samples and a downloader. So far, the Jokra packer appears to be rare: it is

³⁵ “Are the 2011 and 2013 South Korean Cyberattacks Related?” *Symantec (official blog)*. Mar 29 2013. < <http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are-2011-and-2013-south-korean-cyber-attacks-related> >

³⁶ Packers are wrappers put around pieces of software to compress and/or encrypt their contents, usually with the view of minimizing download times and storage space or to protect copyrighted coding. Oftentimes, they are used in malware to disguise the contents of malicious files from malware scanners. (Source: Virus Bulletin <<http://www.virusbtn.com/resources/glossary/packer.xml> >)

limited to Korea and has only covered Jokra, the downloader, and the back door Trojan containing the “Z:” build string. Given this low prevalence, the packer is likely to be in use by only one group, confirming the link between Backdoor.Prioxer.B and Trojan.Jokra. They shared the same build path shown in the following strings:

A sample of Trojan.Jokra malware:

Z:\Work\Make Troy\3RAT Project\3RATClient_Load\Release\3RATClient_Load.pdb

A sample of Backdoor.Prioxer.B:

**Z:\Work\Make Troy\Concealment Troy\Exe_Concealment_Troy(Winlogon_Shell)
\DII\Concealment_Troy(DII)\Release\Concealment_Troy.pdb**

Again, the common build path “Z:\work\Make Troy” proves not only the link between Trojan.Jokra and Backdoor.Prioxer.B, but also connections between the 2013 Trojan.Jokra and the 2011 Trojan.Koredos attacks as almost identical backdoors surged during both incidents.

In addition to the aforementioned analysis, the Symantec analysis further suggests possible involvement of a professional hacker group employed and ordered to perform attacks against South Korea. The malware build path starts with “Z:\work”, an indication that the hackers created a work folder to develop a Trojan. This contrasts with the general understanding that independent hackers would hardly store a Trojan in a “work” folder, as they would do it for “fun” rather than for “work”.

Investigation by the South Korean government

Soon after the cyberattack, the South Korean government opened an investigation into the March 20 attack by a team composed of military, civil and government experts. On April 10 2013, South Korea’s Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning released the mid-term

results³⁷ of the investigation holding North Korea responsible. The investigation team collected a total of 76 samples of malware and found that 9 of them were used for the destruction purpose and the remaining 67 for the penetration and monitoring purpose. The team also analyzed military and intelligence data on North Korea's previous cyberattacks against South Korea and concluded the March 20 attack had been prepared for more than 8 months. The four main reasons cited as the evidence to the North Korean responsibility in the attack are as follows:

Suspicious access to the targeted servers

Since June 2012, at least six computers from North Korea had accessed targeted firms' networks as many as 1,590 times to spread malware and steal data. Some of these computers even reconnected to the servers on the next day of the attack in an attempt to delete remaining traces which may help disclose their identity.

Exposure of an IP address based in Pyongyang

On February 22 2013, an IP address identified as "175.45.178.xx" accessed South Korean routes, probably to conduct technical tests for remote controlling prior to the attack. South Korean investigators later retraced the geographical location of the IP address to the North Korean Start Joint Venture based in Ryugyong-dong residential district of Pyongyang. This IP address exposure is believed to have occurred accidentally. As for the possibility of IP spoofing by a third party intending to bring a false charge against North Korea, the chances are rather rare. IP spoofing is possible in a situation where hacker sends out a unilateral command such as in DDoS attack. On the contrary, APT attack like the March 20 attack requires continuous bidirectional communication between the hacker and the

³⁷ "Mid-term Release of Civil-Government-Military Joint Team's Investigation into 3.20 Cyberterror"
Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning. Apr 10 2013
<http://www.msip.go.kr/Board_detailForm.action?bbsId=72&bbsNo=182>

compromised computers.³⁸ Thus, an IP spoofing which would prevent the hacker from receiving a reply is highly unlikely.

Routing points similar to those in the past attacks

Among the 49 IP addresses (25 South Korean, 24 overseas) through which the culprits routed their attacks, 22 of them (18 South Korean and 4 overseas) were identical to the ones discovered in the past cyberattacks attributed to North Korea. Other IP addresses used in the attack were based in more than 10 countries including the US, Hong Kong and Australia, reflecting the North's growing technical ability to diversify their routing points. This is in contrast with the past attacks in which North Koreans mostly used Chinese IP addresses for routing. The increasingly diversified routing points further allude to the growing difficulty associated with investigations into future cyberattacks.

Reuse of malware

Of the 76 samples of malware used in the March 20 attack, at least 30 had been used by the North Koreans in the past attack. South Korean investigators also found an 8-digit identification code used exclusively by North Korean hackers for distinguishing of the compromised computers. The code had already been discovered in previous cyberattacks attributed to North Korea.

Based on these findings, the South Korean government pointed at North Korea as behind the March 20 attack. In preparation for the March 20 attack, the North Koreans were keen to exploit security vulnerabilities on the networks of South Korea's private institutions, notably administrators PCs, corporate intranet servers, and antivirus software.³⁹ Collecting

³⁸ "Evidence for North Korean implications in March 20 attack" *Halos*. Apr 10 2013.

<<http://www.halos.co.kr/community/notice/view.do?noticeCode=124>>

³⁹ Young-jeon Kwon. "Intellectualization of North Korean cyberwarfare". *Financial News*. Apr 11 2013.

<http://www.fnnews.com/view?ra=Sent0701m_View&corp=fnnews&arcid=13041106114054&cDateYear=2013&cDateMonth=04&cDateDay=11>

security data one by one from a broad range of institutions involves a penance over a long period of time. Yet, the North Koreans were able to execute the task, suggesting that the March 20 attack was part of carefully planned long-term tactics rather than the result of an impulsive act.

Apart from the technical aspects, North Korea had previously warned of upcoming strikes against major institutions in South Korea though it did not specify the attack methods. About a year earlier, North Korea's Ministry of the People's Armed Forces condemned KBS, MBS and YTN, appearing among the victims of the March 20 attack, as the media outlets unjustly reporting biased news against North Korea. It further threatened that they would have to "pay the price for their acts."⁴⁰ Coincidence alone cannot fully explain that these media firms were simultaneously attacked on March 20. The attack indeed proved that the North mated its words and deeds.

Then, other questions arise. Why does North Korea increasingly opt for cyberattacks in recent years? What are the strategic calculations behind the provocations?

STRATEGIC CALCULATIONS BEHIND THE MARCH 20 ATTACK

In international relations, nations are willing to bear different costs in exchange for benefits. North Korea's underpinning foreign policy remains as regime survival and the perpetuation of the Kim dynasty descending down to the current young leader Kim Jong-un, the third generation of the Kim to accede to the throne. Accordingly, North Koreans are willing to sacrifice more in exchange for strategic means helping the regime survival. Lewis also concluded the North is "clearly willing to take greater risks than most nations" and North

⁴⁰ "North Korea behind cyberattack? Previous cyberattacks against South Korea" *Yonhap News Agency*. Mar 20 2013
<<http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2013/03/20/1801000000AKR20130320193051014.HTM>
[L](#) >

Koreans are “willing to spend scarce resources to gain asymmetric advantages” including nuclear and missile programs despite the international pressure to stop them.⁴¹

Given that a well-prepared cyberattack can cause considerable damage and disorder to highly wired South Korea, the North has chosen to develop cyberforce as a strategic weapon. Its development does not require costly investment in installments and materials as does a nuclear program. Moreover, unlike nuclear weapons and missiles for which external actors constantly exercise pressure for their discontinuation, covert cyberweapons mitigate the consequences of the use. Indeed, when accused of the cyberattack which took place against South Korea on March 20 2013, the North reacted angrily by denying its involvement. On April 12, Radio Pyongyang termed the accusation as a “calculated provocation” to exacerbate the already tense situation in the Korean Peninsula.⁴² No matter how the North Koreans reacted, strategic advantages brought by cyberweapons seem to outweigh the potential costs North Korea has to bear.

REPLACING CONVENTIONAL PROVOCATIONS

Hackers generally target civil or financial organizations seeking for financial gains or confidential corporate information. However, no evidence was found to link the primary objective of the March 20 attack with such types of gains. Investigators instead weighed the motivation toward a political one.⁴³

The unanimous adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2087 on January 22 2013 condemned North Korea for the launch of Kwangmyongsong-3 and broadened already existing sanctions on North Korea. A series of subsequent actions and

⁴¹ James A. Lewis. “Who Is “Whois”?” *Foreign Policy*. Mar 21 2013.
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/21/who_is_whois>

⁴² Radio Pyongyang. April 12 2013 Rpt. in “Internal Affairs on North Korea” *Korean Institute for National Reunification*. March/April 2013, volume 7, number 2.

⁴³ *Foreign Policy*. Mar 21 2013.

rhetoric from North Korea escalated tensions in the Korean Peninsula. The North conducted a nuclear test on February 12 and informed China of its intention to conduct two more nuclear tests in 2013. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2094 adopted on March 7 2013 marked another international condemnation against the nuclear test. In response to the UN resolution, the North Korean government closed its joint border and cut off the hotline to South Korea.

Later, the North confirmed it ended the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. Declaring the North-South non-aggression agreement void, North Korea warned of an upcoming “merciless” military retaliation against its enemies. Against this backdrop, annual ROK-US joint military exercises took place amid heightened tensions. Historically, the North has tirelessly displayed hysterical defiance to the South Korean and US annual joint military exercises Key Resolve and Foal Eagle.

The 2013 Key Resolve exercises were scheduled for between March 11 to March 21 and the cyberattack broke out on the eve of its termination. In fact, North Korea’s denunciation of this year’s exercise went far beyond the level of criticism it used to express. Indeed, the 2013 Key Resolve marked another significant development in the military cooperation between South Korea and the US. With the view of showing its resolve in deterring North Korean nuclear threat and enhancing its strategic posture in the Asia-Pacific regions, the US mobilized the B-52 bombers from Anderson Air force base in Guam to carry out simulated nuclear bombing raids on North Korea.

The sortie of the B-52 was believed to pose a considerable threat to North Korea as the bomber was equipped with both precision-guided conventional and nuclear ordnance.⁴⁴ The

⁴⁴ Bill Gertz. “U.S. B-52 bombers simulated raids over North Korea during military exercises” *The Washington Times*. Mar 19 2013. <<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/19/us-b-52-bombers-simulated-raids-over-north-korea-d/?page=all> >

overwhelming cyberattack just before the end of Key Resolve raised strong suspicion that North Korea condemned this year's overtly clear military posture against its nuclear ambition through the cyberattack. Moreover, a conventional provocation would have been too risky during the joint exercises when ROK-US forces were ready to carry out large-scale operations.

In fact, cyberattack often works to the advantage of the attacker side by delaying or reducing retaliatory actions from the victim. Nations targeted by cyberattack avoid taking rash countermeasures until concrete evidence unveils the identity of the culprit. But the process of reaching a conclusion may take up to a few months if hackers leave little or intentionally wrong traces in order to obfuscate their identity. Even if evidence is clear, no legal basis exists to justify a state-level cyber counterattack and defines to what extent the principle of proportionality should apply. For South Korea, the March 20 attack did not cause any kinetic damage or human loss unlike North Korea's conventional military provocations in 2010 that sank the South Korean naval ship Cheon-an and shelled Yeonpyeong Island.

Thus, it was not as clear how to respond to the North Korean cyber provocation even after investigation concluded on the North Korean implication months after the incident. Planning counterstrike against computer networks in North Korea would have been meaningless given its extremely limited, if not isolated, network systems. To make matters worse, consensus was not formed among South Koreans whether the findings of the government investigation was convincing enough to attribute the attack to North Korea. Faced with an unprecedented scale of cyberattacks, South Korea only had few options to choose from.

The attack demonstrated North Korea's strategic use of cyberforce in the midst of heightened political and military tensions. Due to the lack of hard evidence in cyberattack,

North Korea successfully raised fears for South Koreans and damaged important networks while officially denying its implication to minimize the risk of retaliation. Consequently, North Koreans are likely to launch more cyberattacks against South Korea in replacement of conventional military provocations.

CAUSING SOCIAL CHAOS

Major victims of the March 20 attack were South Korea's well-known media and financial companies. What could be the gains for the North by disrupting the nationwide networks of broadcasters and financial institutions? Interestingly, closely tied to the daily activities of people, abnormalities in the functioning of both sectors can be noticed immediately. TV and radio stations occupied by a hostile side may broadcast manipulated contents which dramatically increases public fears. Even worse, people become gripped with panic if access to their personal bank accounts is suddenly denied. Although though the culprits of the March 20 attack did not cross the red line by actually carrying out such actions, this observation suggests that they at least had in expectation that their malicious activities cause an immediate chaos in South Korea.⁴⁵ By hacking into the nation's biggest broadcasters and banks, the hackers would want to magnify the impacts and repercussions.

In addition, media and financial firms can maximize disorder in a war time. Broadcasting stations act as the central channel of information transmission under emergency. Paralyzing or spreading false information across the targeted nation will bring invaluable advantage to the attacker side. From this perspective, the cyberattack against South Korean broadcasters on March 20 may also be understood as North Korea's trial-run to measure the extent of damage caused to South Korea's communications infrastructure and observe the readiness of the cyber defense system. In fact, some believe that North Korea has acquired

⁴⁵ "Who's behind simultaneous hacking into broadcasters and financial sector?" *SBS*. Mar 20 2013. <http://news.sbs.co.kr/section_news/news_read.jsp?news_id=N1001690871 >

cyberforce well beyond the level shown during the attack. The March 20 attack only partially revealed the North's cyber capabilities, far less than its actual strength. There is a fair chance that North Korean cyberforce is already capable of bringing down South Korea's critical infrastructures.⁴⁶ In the March 20 attack, however, the North intentionally avoided deploying the full forces. If North Korea's goal was limited to arousing public fear, there would have been little use of deploying excessive forces beyond what appeared sufficient. Doing so would only have increased the risk of being caught if the attempt had failed.

ASYMMETRIC AND COVERT, YET SUBSTANTIVE

In the middle of chronic economic hardships, confronting the South with conventional weapons is not viable nor does it appear economically sustainable. Under such circumstances, the North is naturally attracted to unconventional weapons with asymmetrical advantages, among which are nuclear, missiles and cyber weapons.

When used against South Korea, they are able to transform the perceived advantage of the South into weakness. Facing cyberwarfare, the South's advanced computer infrastructures would become the effective potential targets from the North Korean perspective. On the contrary, South Korea would have a difficulty with identifying targets in North Korea owing to its network environment largely disconnected from outside.

The advantage brought by well-developed cyberforce is significant even in comparison with nuclear weapons, another asymmetric weapon that North Korea has been eager to develop. North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons calls forth tightened sanctions from UN Security Council which restrict North Korea's weapons trade or any materials that can be used for weapons production. The sanctions also set barriers to financing missiles and nuclear programs by freezing North Korean assets abroad. Nuclear weapons are also likely to carry

⁴⁶ Interview with Prof. Lim.

burden on China's back, the traditional ally of North Korea which now wants to become an influential member of the international community. For North Korea, recent leadership transition in China adds uncertainty to the geopolitics surrounding the Korean Peninsula. Different from the Cold War during which solid North Korea-Chinese ties guaranteed friendly bilateral relationships, current Chinese approach to North Korean issues do not always work in favor of North Korea's interest. New Chinese President Xi Jinping appears to prefer practical foreign policy promoting Chinese interest internationally rather than turning a blind eye to the misbehaviors of the communist ally.⁴⁷

North Korea can no longer fully rely on Chinese support to go against international norms if doing so means pushing China to handle additional pressure from other countries to foil North Korean nuclear ambitions. Further deterioration of diplomatic ties with China will only deepen North Korea's international isolation. Therefore, it seems more viable for the North to use the nuclear programs as a bargaining chip while deploying cyberforce to cause covert, but substantive damage to South Korea.

CYBER BASES IN CHINA

Regardless of its real intention, China has provided North Korea with necessary materials and operational bases to test and launch cyberattacks. Over the past years, North Korea has established IT subcontract companies in China mostly in the northeastern provinces where geographical proximity facilitates North Korean business activities in the regions. North Korean software engineers work for Chinese or North Korean IT companies in normal times to earn foreign currency. To make additional money, they sometimes develop

⁴⁷ Jonathan D. Pollack. "Obama, Xi and North Korea: The Long Overdue Conversation" *Brookings*. Jun 4 2013.
<<http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/06/04-north-korea-obama-xi-jinping-meetings-pollack>>

illegal software for South Korean criminal groups.⁴⁸ These IT workers transform into state hackers when an order is dispatched from the Reconnaissance General Bureau in Pyongyang.

Referring to the March 20 attack, not only the attack was launched using IP addresses based in China, but also about a month before the attack, a large number of North Korean IT workers on one month visa suddenly flowed across the border to Shenyang and Hunchun. The owner of a local inn that accommodated some of the workers later reported seeing them using strange equipment similar to an antenna.⁴⁹ If this reporting is accurate, then some North Korean hackers crossed the border to carry out a cyberattack with North Korean workers already present in China. In China, North Korean software engineers are perceived as skillful workforce available at a relatively low cost. Although Chinese public security bureau is known to be aware of the malicious cyber activities against foreign governments, no concrete measures have been taken against them.⁵⁰

Additionally, North Korean cyberforce present in China poses a constant long-term threat to South Korea. In collaboration with South Korean criminals in China, North Korean workers develop illegal software called “auto programs” that collect online game items convertible into cash. In the process of the development, North Korean workers intentionally install malware in the software which is then sold to South Korean brokers.⁵¹ Ultimately, the malware spreads across the game users once it penetrates into South Korean servers. Recently, North Korean hackers focus their activities on developing and distributing smartphone applications, so the South Korean users unconsciously download the malware installed in the applications.

⁴⁸ *Sisa Press*. Aug 24 2011.

⁴⁹ Sang-min Park, “North Korea behind Illegal Games” *KBS*, Apr. 19 2013.

<http://news.kbs.co.kr/news/naverNewsView.do?SEARCH_NEWS_CODE=2646300>

⁵⁰ *TV Chosun*. Mar 31 2013.

⁵¹ *KBS*, Apr. 19 2013.

The malware not only collects the users' sensitive personal information stored on their smartphones but also compromise the devices for potential cyberattacks.⁵² Clearly, South Korean computer networks remain unguarded against malicious activities of North Korean IT developers in China.

The particularly vulnerable Internet security conditions in China further exacerbate the situation. Illegal software and files downloads commonly practiced on Chinese websites help dissemination of malware, some of which planted by North Korean hackers.⁵³ As a result, Chinese computers are easily compromised which can be later used for North Korean hackers' cyber operations against South Korea.

North Korea reportedly brought in 12 LAN cables from China in 2010 to command and control cyber operations directly from Pyongyang.⁵⁴ However, China still serves as the main attack base for North Korea, in part to avert possible operational mistakes which may reveal the North Korean involvement. Thus, South Korea should always take the implicit role of China into account when examining North Korean cyber operations.

THE NEXT CYBERATTACK?

Those developing cyberforce ultimately aim at taking control of the target's critical infrastructures. In the past, controlling critical infrastructures from a distance was often regarded as an imaginary scenario. However, the discovery of Stuxnet in 2010 that sabotaged centrifuges at Natanz nuclear site in Iran marked the advent of cyberattacks causing direct kinetic damages from a distance. Such move will only intensify as national critical infrastructures are increasingly connected to the Internet. In line with this trend, North Korea

⁵² *Sisa Press*, Aug 24 2011.

⁵³ Interview with Prof. Lim.

⁵⁴ Eun-seo Shin. "China increases regulations against North Korean hackers" *TV Chosun*. Mar 31 2013. <http://news.tv.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/03/31/2013033190007.html >

also aims at damaging South Korea's critical infrastructures when it deems such action necessary.

South Korea's major infrastructures usually include telecommunications, media, finance, energy, and transportations. The March 20 attack demonstrated a successful mobilization of North Korean cyberforce against South Korea's major finance and media infrastructures. As for the ensuing attack, South Korean cybersecurity experts argue transportation systems and nuclear power plants are likely to be the next targets.^{55, 56} If North Korean hackers somehow manage to plant malware in a South Korean nuclear command and control system, a variety of its operations will cause fatal damage to South Korea. The malware may operate in concealment and collect secret nuclear management data from inside. In the worst case, it may even manipulate the nuclear facilities against South Korea in the event of war in the Korean peninsula. As for the transportation system, derailment of a KTX train that carries hundreds of thousands of passengers on a daily basis would cause disastrous human and material losses against South Korea.⁵⁷ There is high probability that North Korea has already acquired the techniques to put such plans into action, except it has not felt the need to go so far as to do so.⁵⁸

Moreover, the next cyberwarfare will be riddled with intense psychological operations. As it can be inferred from the term "psychological", the operations are invisible but take the form of pro-North Korean propagandas and incitements on South Korean websites on a constant basis. They were first commanded by the late North Korean leader Kim Jong-il who

⁵⁵ Interview with both Prof. Lim and the South Korean police inspector.

⁵⁶ Hyuk-jin Park. "Interview with Son Yeong-dong, former president of National Security Research Institute". *Weekly Chosun*. 1 Apr 2013.

<<http://weekly.chosun.com/client/news/viw.asp?nNewsNumb=002250100006&ctcd=C07>>

⁵⁷ Korea Train Express, referring to South Korea's high speed rail system.

⁵⁸ Interview with Prof. Lim. During the interview, he said North Korea has already developed the skills to hit South Korea's critical infrastructures and some malware possibly has begun operation in the infrastructures.

defined the Internet as a special space where South Korean national security laws are emasculated. Different from the attacks exploiting target's technical vulnerabilities, psychological operations convey selected information to the audiences in the targeted country to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups and individuals.⁵⁹

Through the omnidirectional psychological operations, the North Koreans aim at cultivating South Korean public opinions favorable to North Korean policies. More important, they seek to cause serious disunity among South Koreans, because fiercely divided public opinion will prevent a prompt decision making and its effective implementation by the government. Therefore, the real danger of cyber psychological operations comes from its ability to encroach conveniently on the South Korean population to limit the nation's response against the threats from North Korea.⁶⁰

Taking these aspects into account, the following scenario can be formulated as a hypothesis of the next cyberattack from North Korea. Through psychological operations in normal times, North Korea slackens South Korea's defensive posture against North Korean provocations. Once a war breaks out, pre-planted malware neutralizes considerable part of South Korea's response by paralyzing its major military facilities, communications systems, and critical infrastructures.⁶¹

South Korea, already devastated by the pre-assault cyber operations, is now easily brought down by North Korea's final touch with conventional arms. Although this only

⁵⁹ DoD. Joint electronic library [online, cited: May 28, 2012]. <<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/>>. Retrieved on Steve Winterfeld and Jason Andress. "The Basics of Cyber Warfare" Chapter 6. Psychological Weapons. Syngress. December 28, 2012 <<http://my.safaribooksonline.com/book/ethics/9780124047372/chapter-6dot-psychological-weapons/chp007.html>>

⁶⁰ *Weekly Chosun*. 1 Apr 2013.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

provides a hypothetical case, South Korea should prepare itself against the worst possible scenarios with regards to the growing cyberthreats from North Korea.

HOW SHOULD SOUTH KOREA PREVENT DESTROYSEOUL?

Over the eight months during which the attack was under preparation, North Korean malware successfully escaped detection, which manifests the insufficient cyber capabilities on the South Korean side, North Korea's sophisticated cyber techniques, or both. In reality, "perfect security" in cyberspace is a flawed concept.⁶² Hackers are there to make unreal things happen. The notion of cyberwarfare itself was unfamiliar to many only a few years ago. However, in 2012 alone, the web security company Kaspersky reported having detected 200,000 new malicious programs on daily average.⁶³

Facing the unending emergence of new malware at an exponential speed, the effectiveness of the existing security measures is destined to fade away quickly. Indeed, relying solely on technical solutions cannot guarantee lasting advantage in cybersecurity and this is why South Korea should build its cyber strategy at multiple levels.

NEED FOR A NATIONAL CONSENSUS ON GROWING CYBERTHREATS FROM NORTH KOREA

A nationwide consensus on the existence of the threat and support for government actions are prerequisite for building effective security frameworks. Therefore, any effort to strengthen national cybersecurity should begin by revisiting this concept.

Whenever a major security incident sweeps across South Korea implying a linkage with North Korea, South Koreans tend to question the veracity of information due to the

⁶² Interview with Prof. Lim.

⁶³ Virus News. "2012 by the numbers: Kaspersky Lab now detects 200,000 new malicious programs every day" *Kaspersky Lab*. Dec 10 2012.

<http://www.kaspersky.com/about/news/virus/2012/2012_by_the_numbers_Kaspersky_Lab_now_detects_200000_new_malicious_programs_every_day>

ideological division deeply rooted in the South Korean politics. In the wake of the March 20 attack, the official investigation results could not convince the entire South Korean public of the North Korean responsibility. Some remained skeptical of the findings presented as the evidence to the North Korean role. Others cast a doubt whether North Korea was chosen as a scapegoat in an attempt to conceal the weakness of the South Korean government's cybersecurity policies.⁶⁴ In fact, the divided public opinion was the blunt reflection of public mistrust and criticism against the government's failure to prevent cyberattacks from reoccurring. Given that public opinion can exercise a significant influence on national agendas, the South Korean government needs to take appropriate measures to address the problem.

Making matters worse, inept government responses in the past did not help settle down the public suspicion. In the aftermath of the Nonghyup Bank hacking in April 2011, for example, inconsistent positions taken by investigating authorities only fuelled confusion in the hearing before members of the National Assembly. While the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the Public Prosecutors Office attributed the attack to North Korea, the Financial Supervisory Service stood indecisive regarding the North Korean responsibility.⁶⁵ In the recent March 20 attack, the government put public confidence at stake when it hastily pointed out the North as accountable at a premature stage.

The announcement came out some 20 days after the investigation began, too quick compared to the three months taken before releasing the results of the investigation into the 2011 Nonghyup incident. Because investigation can usually take up to a few months due to long and tedious IP retracing work, some raised suspicion against its thoroughness.

⁶⁴ Jae-jin Lee "Suspicion raises against investigation" *Media Today*. Apr 10 2013. <<http://www.mediatoday.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=108679>>

⁶⁵ In-sung Kim. "So it's North Korea again?" *OhMyNews*. Apr 10 2013. <http://www.ohmynews.com/nws_web/view/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0001853270>

Furthermore, the announcement took place by the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning (MSIP) at the instigation of NIS while the National Police Agency⁶⁶ opted out of the press conference.⁶⁷ In fact, the Police Agency had already accumulated a comparable amount of data when NIS and MSIP held the press conference. Nevertheless, it decided to wait until they could collect supplementary evidence through foreign C&C servers in cooperation with foreign police agency.⁶⁸

The decision was based on the belief that ensuring consistency and transparency throughout the process is particularly important in gathering virtual evidence, so the investigation results can easily earn public trust. In any case, the controversy surrounding investigation into the March 20 attack reveals the lack of both unified and consistent national approach to a major cyberattack. Rather than executing the investigation in a comprehensive national framework under the leadership of a strong coordinating entity, national investigating authorities tackled the same incident separately. In order to enhance efficiency in the investigating process, South Korea needs a well-coordinated inter-ministerial framework that can bring about prompt and efficient investigation into cyberattack. A unified approach to the investigation and consistency in the findings will naturally increase public trust.

Solid cybersecurity strategy should be built on a firm national consensus on the existence of the threat. As the first step toward enhancing national cybersecurity, the South Korean government should demonstrate before the nation the North Korean threat is real. It is only through this process that future cybersecurity measures will be implemented successfully.

⁶⁶ The police officer interviewed for this paper admitted concluding on the North Korean responsibility was considered too premature at that time, although additional investigation later confirmed the North Korean implication in the March 20 attack.

⁶⁷ *Media Today*. Apr 10 2013.

⁶⁸ Interview with the South Korean police inspector.

REVISITING THE CYBER CONTROL TOWER

Following the two major cyberattacks in 2011, the South Korea government made public its decision to create a National Cyber Security Master Plan (Master Plan). The plan addressed fundamental problems that South Korea must overcome to enhance national cybersecurity and include the following as the main course of actions:

- establishment of a joint response system comprised of the private, public and military sectors;
- protection of critical infrastructures;
- systemic national level response to cyberattack including protection, detection and resistance to assault;
- developing deterrence mechanisms through international cooperation; and
- building a national cybersecurity control tower.⁶⁹

Nevertheless, the outbreak of the March 20 attack demonstrated the fundamental weakness of South Korea's current cybersecurity strategy is not the lack of policy measures, but that of viable implementation mechanisms for their successful execution. Apparently, the government could not prevent another major cyberattack, nor could it reduce the damage and public controversy in the aftermath of the attack. Indeed, good policy alone cannot result in the intended benefits if not implemented in the way it maximizes the benefits.

A main pillar of the Mater Plan contains the establishment of a National Cybersecurity Control Tower (Control Tower) with the view of enhancing prompt coordination among relevant government agencies against cyberattacks. Government agencies forming the Control Tower are responsible for the implementation of policies that are specific to their

⁶⁹ "Strategic Discussion on National Cybersecurity in Response to 3.20 Cyberattack" *Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning*. Apr 11 2013
<http://www.msip.go.kr/Board_detailForm.action?bbsId=72&bbsNo=219>

own competence. For example, the Korean Police Agency, NIS, the Korea Information Security Agency and the Ministry of National Defense ensure cybersecurity in crimes and terrors, the public sector, the private sector and defense respectively. Although Cheong Wa Dae, the South Korean presidential office, is officially the head of the Control Tower, in reality, it is NIS that plays a pivotal role by acting as the working-level chief and manages the inter-agency coordination. However, this structure might prevent the Control Tower from realizing its goals as originally intended.

As mentioned earlier, the creation of the Control Tower envisages a prompt and coordinated response from government agencies in charge of national cybersecurity. The inter-agency coordination can be notably enhanced by a vertical command structure with a command office on the top that can exercise sufficient authority over others. In normal times, the command office should plan and oversee the nation's general cybersecurity strategies and their executions based on the periodic reports of trends submitted by individual agencies. Once a cyberattack raids the country, the office should quickly assign a specific role to each agency in order to bring out a coordinated national level response against the cyberattack.

Therefore, the ideal functioning of the Control Tower should be based on a hierarchical structure that facilitates a centralized information gathering on one hand and a powerful command structure on the other. Given that the Control Tower should also act as a coordinator mediating possible frictions among the agencies and give them directions to follow, it is not viable to confer such authority to one specific agency over others as working-level chief.

Instead, it is recommended that Cheong Wa Dae proactively expands its competency in cybersecurity. Already acting as a powerful executive organ of the nation, integrating the Control Tower into the full competence of Cheong Wa Dae will create a unified channel of

communication without an overlap.⁷⁰ Additionally, using its far-reaching relations with foreign governments, Cheong Wa Dae will be able to facilitate smooth flow of information exchange on cybersecurity with foreign governments and promote international cooperation.⁷¹

It is time for Cheong Wa Dae to prioritize cybersecurity in its agendas. In addition, to derive the desired outcomes from the Control Tower, it needs to expand its role as both the official and de facto command office of the Tower.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON CYBERSECURITY

The transnational nature of cyber operations stresses the need for cooperation at international level. For South Korea, it should consider a variety of measures including notably opening bilateral cooperation with China, setting global cyber security governance, enacting cyber security laws, and building partnership with countries in the process of developing IT infrastructure.

As mentioned earlier, North Korean hackers, normal time IT workers, are physically present in China. Although most of them might have arrived in China through due process, their malicious operations disrupting another country's cyber infrastructure should be subject to regulations. Due to the operations taking place under the jurisdiction of China, however, there is little room for South Korean authorities to act against the activities unless China agrees to provide support.

If China agrees with the idea at all, as the first step of such support, it can officially ban foreign hackers organizations' operations based in its territory. Although the difficulty

⁷⁰ Jongbin-Seo "Interview with Prof. Seung-joo Kim, cybersecurity expert at Korea University" *Pyonghwa Bangsong*. Mar 28 2013.

<http://bbs2.pbc.co.kr/bbs/bbs/board.php?bo_table=open&wr_id=6552>

⁷¹ Interview with Prof. Lim.; also from Jisung-Noh "Cheong Wa Dae should preside cyber control tower" *Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology*. 2013.

<http://mshelp.kaist.ac.kr/Essay/Essay_2013/7.pdf>

associated with proving the crime and possible diplomatic frictions with North Korea might set practical barriers to the actual punishment of the hackers, the official prohibition itself will demonstrate China's will to confront illegal abuse of its Internet infrastructures by foreign agents and rid China of the indirect responsibility from conniving in the North Korean cyber operations. Ultimately, such move should gradually pave the path for bilateral cooperation between South Korea and China for the investigation into North Korea's cyberattacks launched from China.

Introducing an international legal framework guarding cybersecurity is another crucial area for consideration. Questions critical to confronting rising cross-border cyber operation require appropriate legal approach. These may count, among others, deciding on the internationally agreed threshold to determine the scale of cyberattack justifying a counterattack; international regulations on belligerent cyber actions; legal basis for a third party to mediate a cyberconflict involving more than two nations.

Currently, these questions remain largely unanswered. In practice, any law may be imperfect to control acts in the virtual world. Nevertheless, it does not mean that cyberwarfare should be neglected and left as a lawless area. In the case of chemical weapons, countries internationally agreed on the need to ban the use of chemical weapons by signing the Chemical Weapons Convention despite their different approach to the detailed mechanisms of the regulations. A similar principle can be applied to the regulations of cyberwarfare.

The move calling for the imposition of legal limits on cyber operations will gradually mainstream related issues one by one.⁷² It will eventually emphasize the need for creating

⁷² Interview with Prof. Lim.

global cyber governance in which nations gather, build cooperation frameworks and introduce the most basic norms to be respected in pursuing cybersecurity.

There is nevertheless a long way to go before the above recommendations come to the realization. In promoting international cooperation in cybersecurity, a number of practical difficulties still lay scattered. For example, following the March 20 attack, few countries except the US and Hong Kong, responded positively to the request of cooperation on investigation from the Korean Police Agency.⁷³

The reasons vary but may include, among others, the lack of precedents in their countries, less critical use of IT technologies and the fear of creating constraints that might trap their own cyber activities in the future. Despite the difficulties, South Korea should concert efforts to build a cooperation framework with like-minded countries. South Korea recently took the initiatives to join the EU Cyber Convention.⁷⁴

Such move should be welcomed and promoted further. Another possibility comes from partnership with the US. Being the frontrunner in cybersecurity and a long-time ally of South Korea, the US can lead the global discussion on cybersecurity with South Korea. Starting from relatively small projects, the cooperation should gradually expand to other areas such as secondment of personnel and the establishment of strategic information exchange channels.

In the long-term, providing technical assistance to countries in the process of developing IT infrastructure will bring another strategic advantage to South Korea. North Korea has taken a similar move. For example, it signed an IT cooperation treaty with Laos in March 2013 in addition to the one signed with Syria earlier.⁷⁵ Although details of the cooperation are only vaguely known, it can potentially provide another unguarded base for North Korean

⁷³ Interview with the South Korean police inspector

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Jeong-woo Park “North Korea-Laos strengthened cooperation in IT” *Radio Free Asia*. Mar 21 2013. <http://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/laos-03212013163148.html>

cyber operations outside of China. It is therefore in South Korea's interest to establish and strengthen partnership with countries wishing to improve IT infrastructure. Although doing so may require heavy investment from South Korea at the initial stage, it will eventually help win partner countries' support with cooperation on future cyber-related investigation. Ultimately, it will also enhance their capacity to prevent and apply regulating measures against illegal cyber activities taking place in their territories against South Korea.⁷⁶

Given the borderless characteristics of cyberwarfare, international cooperation is the key to protecting nation against future cyberattacks. South Korea should be creative in exploring various opportunities in this field. At the same time, it should also prepare itself to use the next cyberattack, more than likely to reoccur, as a momentum to call for concrete international cooperation frameworks.

IN SEARCH OF DYNAMIC DEFENSE WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Under North Korea's totalitarian regime, state hackers are not merely skillful technicians, but fierce combatants who are obliged to fight vehemently so they can win the combat. Facing attacks from North Korean cyber soldiers, South Korea must develop strategies leading to dynamic defense. Here, the term dynamic defense can be understood as maintaining up-to-date technological innovations in the field of national cybersecurity and reducing damage from potential cyberattacks through active cooperation between government and the private sector.

In cyberwarfare, defense and offense are inseparable: only a nation accurately understanding enemy's offensive capabilities is able to strengthen its defensive capabilities accordingly. Given that the most dynamic driving force of computer technologies is humans themselves, government needs to build its cybersecurity strategy around discovering and

⁷⁶ Interview with the South Korean police inspector.

training those with special cyber talents. Nevertheless, training state hackers is only part of the dynamic defense scheme. As in the March 20 attack, cyberattacks not only target public institutions, but also private institutions that provide vital services to the population. Therefore, government alone can by no means fend off well-prepared cyberattacks successfully.

In fact, technological agility, essential for developing antivirus and other innovative computer techniques, is better pursued by creative private sector. In the end, two actors work together to enhance national cybersecurity: While the government provides the general picture of national cybersecurity and policy guidelines, the private sector takes part in the efforts by backing the government with innovative technologies. In other words, the South Korean government guides the nation to stay alarmed against external cyberthreats, equips it with the most advanced defense and offensive cyber technologies and support private IT companies in their development of cutting edge technologies. Such interactive mechanism will allow contributions from the private sector to refine the nation's overall cybersecurity.⁷⁷

Active participation from the private sector also plays a significant role in preventing spread of malware. Unlike conventional military arms, cyber weapons are deployed in a cunning manner and individual users are constantly exposed to the danger. An Internet user's incautious click on a website affected by virus can serve as the entry point of fatal malware later attacking critical systems. This establishes another reason why the government should promote cybersecurity in close cooperation with the private sector.

One possibility is to require schools to teach mandatory cybersecurity courses, so the students become familiarized with core issues of cybersecurity from a young age and take due caution in surfing the web. Another possible option for the South Korean government is

⁷⁷ Ibid.

to provide incentives to college students to take internships in software security companies that will give them opportunities to acquire working level knowledge of cybersecurity.⁷⁸

From the perspective of national security, future cyberspace will be a battlefield where human powers come into collision to achieve conflicting national goals. Against this backdrop, only nations working closely with the private sector will certainly take advantage of the human talents and realize dynamic defense in cybersecurity.

These recommendations provide the very basic steps that South Korea should take, but are no way exhaustive. As continuous cyberattacks from North Korea have made cyberwarfare as one of the most alarming security issues for South Korea, it should actively improve available measures against the North Korean threat through various creative means.

CONCLUSION

The paper analyzed the March 20 cyberattack in detail and shed light on the fast developing cyber capabilities of North Korea. Instead of questioning the validity of the cyberthreats from North Korea, the South Korean government and the population should begin a constructive dialogue for enhancing the nation's cyber capabilities to protect computer networks and critical infrastructures from next possible cyberattacks from North Korea.

South Korea, a country keen to explore benefits brought by the Internet, has suffered a heavy blow from a series of North Korea's cyberattacks in the past. Unquestionably, cyberattacks from North Korea are on the rise more than ever causing increasingly grave consequences. From a different point of view, however, incessant North Korean cyberattacks provide South Korea with the opportunity to review its preparedness for cyberwarfare and enhance national cybersecurity system. In doing so, the South Korean government needs to

⁷⁸ Ibid.

prioritize a few strategies in the agenda. These notably include building a national consensus on the existence of the cyberthreats from North Korea, improving current cyberstrategy by restructuring the Cyber Control Tower, promoting international cooperation in cybersecurity and lastly, cooperating closely with the private sector to realize dynamic defense in cyberspace.

In the end, the direction South Korea is about to take at this stage, after undergoing another major cyberattacks in 2013, will determine if it can repulse future attempts for another Dark Seoul, or shiftlessly leave the nation face the advent of Destroy Seoul.

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